The article examines how regional integration courts can act as judicial brakes, at a time when "constitutional coups" -leaders staying in power past constitutional time limits or other forms of actions against the spirit if not always the letter of the constitution -are alarmingly common. The article discusses how regional courts can be used to modify or protect national rule of law and the constitutional order from the outside (i.e. from the regional integration aspect) and the extent to which this can be valid particularly to promote
INTRODUCTION
The recent (December 2017) proposal of the European Commission to activate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Treaty of the European Union against Poland as a reaction against the continuing deterioration of the rule of law situation in that country is but the most recent expression of a 21 st -century phenomenon: a new form of relationship between international legal instruments and domestic law. The discussion about the hierarchy between these two is not new: a long debate has opposed scholars of international and constitutional law in this respect. This article intends to demonstrate that such debates are to a significant degree passé, as new forms of intermingling between international and national legislative levels become more convoluted; it even goes into the so far unchartered territory of relations between international obligations and national constitutions.
To a large extent, this development is linked to the exponential increase of the number and the competences of regional integration organisations and to the fact that these organisations enter substantially into what was until recently exclusively national competences. This intervention has been made possible, among other factors, by the increasing role of regional and sub-regional courts of justice.
Regional courts are often not established by the organisations to deal with the relationship of international and constitutional hierarchy, but rather to deal with interpretation of the regional organisations' basic rules of operation; however, they gradually encroach on other areas than those specifically delimited for them. These areas include in particular the protection of individual rights as well as the safeguarding of constitutional order and balance of powers. This article examines how regional integration courts can be and are used in order to modify or protect national rule of law and the constitutional order from the outside (i.e. from the regional integration aspect rather than domestically) and the extent to which this can promote a uniform interpretation and application of human rights. Although this trend is visible on the European continent both at the level of the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe, it is more striking, because less expected, on other continents, in particular Africa and the Americas. Asia does not possess any developed system of regional integration-most of the existing Asian regional cooperation takes place by inter-state mechanisms. The continent lacks a functioning system of human rights protection "in large part because [the] realties are markedly different from other regions" 1 : these realities are linked to the "territorially vast extent, the large variety of political, economic and social systems, political and judicial oversight, especially in regions with weak or fragile democratic systems, can be a useful addition to national judicial or other mechanism of protection of rule of law and control of the executive. In fact, action by regional courts helps defeat perceptions of majoritarian politics, which in many countries allow for the winner to take all. Under systems of regional oversight, States become aware of the limits they themselves have set and citizens become aware of their possibilities to challenge political power. Obviously, this picture is far from uniform and depends on the implicit acceptance by States and governments. The main handicap is problems of enforcement, which is the reason why regional courts cannot replace national ones in terms of protecting citizens. However, the internationalisation of complaints acts as publicity as well as a judicial brake. States fear the implication of foreigners in internal matters but they fear even more the "bad press" they can get by having an international court rule against them.
The intention of this article is not to demonstrate that regional courts are a panacea against authoritarianism but that they can help reduce its negative consequences. Relatively little academic research exists concerning this new trend, thus this article fills an important gap on an issue that is likely to increase in significance. and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 4 These efforts constitute a response to globalization and the perceived need of neighbouring States to ally themselves in order to better compete in the international arena. In many instances, these forms of regional integration are of an economic or trade nature, intergovernmental in structure and relatively weak in competences. The tendency of several such organisations to emulate the European integration institutional structure (even though integration is much less developed than in the case of the EU) means however that these sub-regional organisations are often endowed with regional courts of justice, as the case is in Europe. Globally, the exception to the trend toward more regional integration with quite powerful organs is Asia. In this continent the regional bodies have limited mandates, restricted to specific issues. 5 Regional courts have a varied degree of competences, usually including the right to interpret the regional integration rules and solve disputes arising therefrom.
On some occasions, however, they are also entrusted with other, quasiconstitutional competences; for instance, upholding principles of democracy and rule of law and resolving conflicts between the various branches of State power.
The combination of the courts being familiar with and part of the regional political regional organisations, at the same time as continental instruments of human rights receive more prominence, and, often, powers. Such a dual development has brought into the forefront the role of regional courts of justice in intervening in domestic constitutional issues and introducing the regional integration obligations by Member States onto the internal arena.
THE JUDICIAL BRAKE
In recent years the courts of justice of certain regional integration systems have taken over a role not originally conceived for them: that of a quasi-regional constitutional court controlling ex post alleged violations of the constitutional order and of the rule of law. In this role, such courts can have an important effect on the political developments especially in situations where leaders exploit legal unclarities or weaknesses and when national courts may have difficulties reacting.
The term "judicial brake" comes from the United States, which is not surprising given the importance of the division of powers and the role of the judiciary in that system. The expression is referred to by Evan Tsen Lee 8 when 6 The regional courts can perform the role of a regional judicial brake. We provide a brief overview of selected regional courts and move on to a discussion of specific cases from these courts that illustrate the tenability of the idea of a judicial brake at the regional level.
CASES IN REGIONAL COURTS

THE COURTS
THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Sub-regional courts may be better placed than larger regional courts to act decisively. At the same time, both Africa and the Americas have continental human rights systems with courts and other institutions with a fairly important mandate. ICHR has been able to exert significant influence in some countries, whereas in others there has been more resistance and it has not been able to have the desired impact. Generally, ICHR has been more effective than the quite pessimistic view when it was inaugurated when many commentators feared States would not make any use of it or would denounce its jurisdiction. 13 Unfortunately, human rights organs appear to have the most effect for counties that in any case have a reasonably good record of protection of rights, or at least the will to improve. In the American system, it means that countries such as Mexico 14 Representatives of the court expressed the opinion that potentially, CCJ could play the role of regional conscience, in which case it could really affect development of democracy in the region, but it does not always appear comfortable in its role. 
THE TRIBUNAL OF MERCOSUR
As opposed to the SICA, which had political and integration objectives from the start (although not always successfully pursued), Mercosur has been described as an intergovernmental structure with community objectives. 21 The fact that it modelled itself on the European Communities did not mean that it copied the idea of a strong institutional structure and independent court. Initially, the institutional structure was very limited, although after some years (in 1996) it was modified to include more organs. Even at this point, there was however no court of justice. TPR is one of many regional tribunals that is underused. In the words of the TPR representatives this is not necessarily for lack of will, but the relevant parties are not sure how to use the tribunals. To counteract this, TPR undertakes outreach activities, promotes its library and so on. The absence of very many cases has underlined other activities and representatives of the tribunal made a point of stressing that few cases does not mean that TPR has no influence. Another aspect that the TPR demonstrates that is the case to some extent also for other American regional tribunals, is how the personalities of the judges or other court officials play a great role.
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
Like in Central America, the States of the Caribbean appear to have a strong incentive for regional cooperation. They come largely from the same colonial 21 
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS AND THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS
The African human rights system consists of two organs, the African exist and are supposed to get stronger, to create a more coherent pan-African regional integration structure, the Commission and Court are relatively independent from the AU. In Africa, both as regards courts and other cooperation, the subregional organs tend to be more active and influential than the pan-regional ones.
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The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) has been granted wide competences, including monitoring procedures, reporting requirements of Member States and inter-State and individual complaints procedures. Views on how efficient the system is in practice vary between it being an expression of taking rights seriously to doubts about any effectiveness whatsoever.
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Since its start of operations, in 2008, the Court's main obstacle to having a significant impact is the limited number of States that allow individual complaints.
Work is ongoing to look into the Court dealing also with international criminal cases, to deal with the criticism -very common in Africa -of the International
Criminal Court being prejudiced against Africa. 46 For entry into force ten ratifications are needed. 47 There are activities going on to advocate for the return of a SADC court with powers also over human rights, but this is mainly at the level of civil society activists.
EFFICIENCY OF THE COURTS
Regional courts present similarities but also differences. Their competences vary both in their content and extent. In addition to interpreting rules directly related to the specific integration issues, many of the courts have been granted further competences. What is most relevant for our analysis are possibilities of taking decisions that support principles of democracy and rule of law, for example when there are conflicts between the various branches of State power with State organs pulling in different directions. 48 Examples of cases are outlined below.
As previously mentioned, we do not provide details on the composition of the courts as such information is accessible from the courts, which are transparent.
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The importance of the personal competences and credibility of the judges is significant. In the absence of a clear and strong institutional role, the fact that distinguished persons sit on the tribunals -the very people who would in any case be asked for advice on integration legal issues -means that the organ will Given the level of integration in the regions analysed, the powers of the courts may appear even surprisingly wide. The reason for this is unclear: it may be related to the fact that States relegate the drafting of judicial aspects of integration to professional jurists without being aware of their impact or because they believesometimes erroneously -that they can control them. In any case, their being endowed by such powers and their better acquaintance with the regional political environment as well as their relative independence from any specific State makes regional courts of justice natural mechanisms of control of political behaviour.
At the same time, many regional court are underused. This may be due to a lack of understanding in the legal community and generally about their role and potential. Interestingly, this has not led to the courts remaining passive or accepting their limited role, but instead has made them undertake outreach activities. Courts can influence other institutions by introducing a rule of law element in discussions that may otherwise remain purely political. However, such an effect is hard to measure and any court that is not functioning as a proper court will eventually lose significance. One of the fundamental principles of the integration process in Central America is that member states have established a democratic regime, not only at constitutional level but also at a community regional institutional one, based on the respect of fundamental rights, in particular the democratic principle of the principle of separation of powers. Community and should be declared null and void. 57 There was a preliminary objection concerning the admissibility of the case, which was rejected by the court. 58 The court also rejected the claimants' call for an injunction, as they found no risk of such irreparable damage that should be at hand for an injunction. 59 In the event, the first instance court rejected the complaint. 60 In the judgement, the court lists the various legal challenges to the referendum process that the complainants had brought in Kenya. The alleged problems with the referendum and the Constitution resulting from the process, included flouting of the law on campaigning, irregularities on polling day, tallying of votes in a manner that gave an inaccurate result and failure to follow the law on publication of the Official Gazette notice on the referendum result. Numerous incidents were brought forward to illustrate wrongdoings, disputed by the government. The EACJ summed up the issue as one of due process.
The case gave EACJ a basis for a deliberation on what due process is. They found that:
In our understanding, the expression "due process" means the same thing as "due process of law". Simply put, "due process" and "due process of law" mean following laid down laws and procedures. Further, "due process of law" is a component of the principle of "the rule of law" as generally understood in Anglo- In another case against Uganda, concerning the failure of the President to appoint judges to the Supreme Court, High Court and Court of Appeals, the EACJ states that it carefully considered principles of good governance and rule of law but found that the President´s preferred course of action did not violate these principles. 68 The regional legal system does not go into details of the governing of the country, provided basic principles are respected. These cases and the statement by the EACJ shows that this may be the regional court that most consciously has dealt with constitutional matters of the Member States.
Elsewhere in Africa, one of the better-known examples of action by regional integration organisations to deal with a constitutional crisis is that of Madagascar and the crisis that has been going on since 2009, with a mixture of a more "classical" and a constitutional coup. Both the AU and SADC have taken action.
However, the issue has been dealt with by various instruments of political and economic pressure rather than as a case in a court of justice. A SADC court may have been able to play a role. As it now is, this is yet another example of "noncases" in regional courts.
INTERVENING IN POLITICAL MATTERS
The ICHR in several cases addressed the political situation in Guatemala following the civil war and was able to exert some influence in the complex situation, where various organs were pulling in different directions as far as the battle against impunity for atrocities committed during the war was concerned. The Court wishes to state that it is not to be taken Gambian government disputed the allegations or in some cases justified the limitations of rights due to the situation in the country.
Among the deliberations of the Commission was how the information about the situation in the country had been obtained. The Commission admitted (in answer to the complaint of the government) that while it would be dangerous to rely exclusively on mass media, it would be equally damaging if the Commission were to reject a communication only because some aspects of it were based on such media. Indeed, the African Charter denies information "exclusively" from mass media but there is no denying that media is key in spreading information. If a remedy has no prospect of success it is no effective remedy.
After finding the case admissible, the Commission examined the claims, analysed whether allegations were proven, whether there may be justifications for limitations of rights and whether proper procedures had been followed. Different conclusions were reached, but it was clearly stated that a military coup, even if peaceful, is a violation of democratic rights. 79 Gambia was asked to bring its law into conformity with the African Charter.
The ECOWAS court had occasion in 2012 to examine the contentious elections The legal questions related to whether the arrest of the Gbagbo family was legal and whether there were any human rights violations during the events. After a careful analysis, admitting the extreme situation in the country, the court found in favour of the complainant as it considered that the arrest and subsequent handling of the matter did not follow the principles of rule of law. Regional courts are aware of the potentially complex relationship with national courts and especially national constitutional courts. The ECOWAS court explicitly mentions that it is not an appeal court over national courts and it has no competence to annul decisions of a constitutional court, although it finds that it can to some extent examine merits in a case that has been deliberated upon by a constitutional court, if the claim made allows for this without leading to potential annulment of the constitutional court verdict.
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The ECOWAS court also demonstrates that it is aware of the situation that people may turn to regional courts when they are dissatisfied with national courts for political reasons. In the case Dias v. Senegal 84 in 2012 the court examined allegations of political bias and denial of the presumption of innocence among other things, but found that the case challenged by the applicant was a criminal case handled in accordance with law by Senegal. It is worth noting that Senegal did not present its view of the facts of the case. The ECOWAS court wanted to signal that it is not a special appeal instance for any national cases.
However, some issues are of such dignity that intervention is needed. In
October 2008, the ECOWAS court issued a landmark ruling on slavery. 85 A woman from Niger, born into slavery and later sold, raped and abused, took a case to a local tribunal after being charged with bigamy for running away and marrying. The ECOWAS court found that slavery is illegal under international law, special conventions and the African Charter. The case was complicated by many factors, such as the master of the woman in question releasing her when threatened with prosecution under the anti-slavery rules but instead using Niger customary law to reclaim her as his wife. She managed to get a local tribunal to rule that she was not legally married to the man but that ruling was changed when she later married and was accused of bigamy. The ECOWAS court came out strongly in defence of her rights, stating that the rules on prohibition of slavery must have a real meaning and not be manipulated with.
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The cases in the now defunct SADC Tribunal were political in nature. Many of the cases involved human rights violations, particularly regarding expropriation of 81 Ibid., para 70. 82 Ibid., para 89. 83 In a case on whether deputies in the National Assembly should be reinstated as they had been wrongfully removed. Tribunal considered claims of torture in connection with the applicant's deportation.
The court determined that the applicant had not exhausted legal remedies and that he had failed to substantiate his claims of ill-treatment. In resolving such cases, the SADC Tribunal used common principles of international human rights law, rather than applying one specific human rights treaty. The Court elaborated first on jurisdiction, as the respondents challenged this.
It pointed out that jurisdiction is quite different from the specific merits of any case and the respondents appear to have misunderstood this -wider -implication of jurisdiction. 101 Generally, the EACJ thoroughly discussed concepts such as not just jurisdiction but also "justiciable" and "triable", rule of law and good governance, using dictionary interpretations and case law. The court was sympathetic to some extent, although it also claimed that the applicants, in the specific case, make a mountain of a molehill: apparently relying on the possibility in future that declarations will be made, so it was just a question of delay. However, the EACJ found that it cannot make rulings on Member States' obligations under another international treaty.
PREREQUISITES FOR INTERVENTION
Courts of Justice can strengthen the rest of the institutional structure and determine the division of competence between the organisation and its Member
States. This quasi-constitutional role makes the organisation different from traditional international organisations with a more limited mandate, where there is no independent organ to determine division of competence, but this is done by the members themselves.
However, there are certain prerequisites that must be met for courts to be able to undertake such a role. Firstly, courts cannot be the only strong institution. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 2 2017
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The regional integration system should have other institutions with significant power to decide and willingness to confront challenges to their power through a regional court. In other words, it is necessary to have a critical mass of integration institutions for courts to be effective. Central American integration, with a relatively weak intergovernmental structure, has given the CCJ significant powers making it a quasi-Supreme Court of the region. Due to this discrepancy the court has not been able to play the serious role envisaged in its Statute: in fact, the CCJ was not asked to rule nor be otherwise involved in the constitutional crisis in Honduras when president Zelaya was overthrown in 2009. At the same time, it faces direct opposition from specific Member States, which refuse to accept its jurisdiction. It has to be said that one such country, Costa Rica, is the most democratic and respectful of rule of law in the region. Its reaction may be presumed to be linked to judicial uncertainty and constitutional matters rather than the presence of the court itself.
This first prerequisite is linked intrinsically to the legitimacy of the court -our second prerequisite. Legitimacy appears in two aspects: the first is legitimacy provided by the national level. There is no question that at the present time national governments have a higher degree of legitimacy than regional integration organisations, with the possible exception of the EU. It is thus necessary that
States recognize or at least tolerate the role of the regional courts. It is very difficult for courts to operate, confronted with unswerving hostility from Member
States. A degree of at least benign indifference and tacit acceptance of its rulings is necessary for the regional court to play a significant role at regional level. This is more easily said than done, given that in several areas of the globe, court rulings, even domestic ones, are frequently disregarded. The second aspect of legitimacy has to do with the people. Courts must be seen both to produce good law and effective law. This aspect is linked to easy access to courts, and even before this, to the capacity of citizens to bring their cases before such courts. Not all regional organisations allow such a process or do so with very stringent conditions, which cannot often be met. Consequently, legitimacy from both States and the people needs to be present for courts to be significant contributors to regional rule of law.
Thirdly, there is the effectiveness of courts. Given the fact that regional integration organisations lack the lawful use of force, regional courts are twice as weak as national courts. Implementation cannot be enforced; it has to be requested. Courts cannot act on their own but need to follow up their rulings with realities that may make application of human rights more difficult. This is an example of where a regional body can be especially well placed.
Courts must take a role and insist on it, vis-à-vis other organs, but they can only do so if they have a certain status and respect. The institutional structure needs to be determined in the founding documents of the organisation or otherwise the way in which such structure will be created (through a constituent assembly) needs to be established. The structure must be clear enough to be effective but at the same time flexible enough to allow the organisation to grow with its tasks. The credibility and success of an organisation are strengthened if details concerning its activities can be established by the organisation's organs themselves. Static organisations where any changes to their role and functions need to go back to the Member States for decision have less of a long-term chance of success or at least of taking on an independent role. Member States must be willing to give the organisation the possibility to lead some life of its own if it is to influence the region in which it operates, rather than just carry out clearly delimited operational tasks given to it.
Autonomy also requires enforcement. Enforcement of decisions in most modern societies passes through the judicial branch. As a result, the presence of regional courts, which rule finally on relevant disputes, is crucial. It is no coincidence that the degree of autonomy of different regional integration ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 2 2017
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organisations increased when and to the extent that they instituted courts which ruled independently.
Until courts have strong legitimacy they must always face the risk that if they are too active, there will be resistance to them. If it is felt that a court can successfully be opposed or ignored if it takes uncomfortable decisions, this is very likely to happen. The fate of the SADC court is a clear illustration of this risk.
TRENDS AND CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the various cases examined does not establish a rule; nor does it set precedents for each and every regional integration scheme. Surreptitious Courts of Justice of regional integration systems can play a very important role in strengthening the system as well as protecting the rights of individualsthus making the system relevant for them and contributing to regional integration becoming part of the political discourse. The fact that courts are hindered in their work can be seen as a sign of the importance as there would be no point in taking specific action to obstruct a court if it were to be irrelevant. It also illustrates the problem if the court has not achieved a sufficient degree of legitimacy, as it is then expedient to do away with it if it makes uncomfortable decisions.
We return to a quote from the EACJ made in relation to costs in the Mary Ariviza and Okotch Mondoh case that nicely illustrates what a regional court can and should mean for ordinary people. The EACJ noted that the Claimants, bringing a case on constitutional irregularities, were "ordinary individuals" who, as they had brought cases in many different organs nationally and also regionally "clearly must have felt strongly that they had genuine grievances requiring judicial adjudication even at regional level. The litigation before this Court was not frivolous and it was ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 2 2017
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of interest not just to the Claimants but to other East Africans as well." 104 The EACJ is a positive example of a court that not just takes its mandate seriously but also sees itself as an organ that must matter to ordinary people in its jurisdiction. The finding of the ACHPR that there are situations in which there cannot be any effective domestic remedies exactly as the case concerns depriving certain people of such remedies, for political reasons, explains why the basis for regional intervention in favour of rule of law can be so important.
It is obvious that there are limits to what regional courts can do and the judges are fully aware of these limits. They have also the counter-example of the SADC tribunal to remind them of the "sudden death" that awaits an all too bold tribunal against a not all too bold despot. They play with specifics, with interpretations and with the superior knowledge of their juridical expertise. They also use the still-present respect for the judicial institution in many African and Latin American countries. The fact that civil society -an element that should increasingly be taken into account in such cases -turns to them, is also to the courts' advantage.
Although the current global political situation appears gloomy, it is not possible to predict whether authoritarianism will get stronger around the world in the coming years or whether democratic principles and rule of law will prevail. It is also uncertain whether regionalism as a trend will continue, especially in building political communities. Most systems of integration start with economic objectives, mostly trade, and gradually accept -willingly or not -that an element of political integration and judicial review is necessary for the smooth operation of economic integration. It is difficult or even impossible to reverse globalization but it is a realistic possibility in the current international political climate. At the same time, one realises that regionalism is more important for smaller countries. It is easier to exercise pressure on the president of Gambia than on the president of Russia. As a result, one cannot establish a uniform pattern for all courts but even in the case of Russia or Turkey, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR acts as an insufficient but still very real brake. It remains an open question to what extent such brakes can hold in the current geopolitical climate. Regional courts require "regional spirit" and therefore governments which have opted for a clearly authoritarian direction and are sufficiently important to forfeit a regional scheme or to establish a regional system of their own can remain impervious to judicial brakes of the kind examined in this article.
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It is also obvious that the international community cannot expect that democracy in Africa and Latin America will be upheld exclusively through courts of justice. In an increasingly interdependent world, the regional courts will be called to play a stronger and perhaps decisive role in safeguarding rule of law at domestic level and at the same time safeguarding the principles of their own regional integration instruments. This is not a role usually endowed on regional courts of justice. The ECJ has not had any similar role when it was shaping European integration. However, it is clear when analysing regional integration on other continents that the European pattern cannot apply as such and should not do so at times when European integration is heavily questioned. It might be propitious for
Europeans to look at the way other regional integration instruments work and take examples from them.
